Two Concepts of Legitimacy

I think it might be useful at this point to introduce into our conversation…

by Andrew Potter on Wednesday, December 3, 2008 8:42pm - 47 Comments

I think it might be useful at this point to introduce into our conversation a distinction employed by Campbell Sharman in his excellent IRPP paper on reforming the Senate. The distinction is between input legitimacy and output legitimacy. 

Input legitimacy relates to the functioning and machinery of an institution: how members are selected, the procedures by which decisions are made and power exercised, and so on. Output legitimacy refers to the public assessment of the relevance and quality of the institution’s performance. As Sharman writes, “Both forms of legitimacy express public assessment of the worth of an institution, but input legitimacy is a matter of the design of the institution while output legitimacy must be earned by the institution’s performance.”

Coyne has written elsewhere on this site, and I obviously agree with him, that — despite the prime minister’s best attempts at convincing Canadians otherwise — there is nothing remotely illegitimate about the coalition’s attempt at taking the reins of parliament. It is, as far as I’m concerned, little more than the predictable contortions of parliament in an extended minority situation. 

But obviously many people feel otherwise, and while I’m tempted to dismiss this as a failure of basic knowledge of civics amongst Canadians, that misses an element that Sharman’s distinction teases out, which is the requirement, ultimately, that the output of an institution be acceptable to the people. Both forms of legitimacy are important, but there is the question of priority. Normally, we tend to think that IL determines OL: That is, we accept the outcome of an election, or a vote in parliament, or what have you, because it has high input legitimacy. To put it another way, as long as the rules are followed we accept the result. 

But it is not that simple, and in the end, I’m inclined to think that output legitimacy has priority. That is, a certain institutional design will only be (input) legitimate to the extent to which it tends on the whole  (note the hedging here) to produce acceptable (that is, output-legitimate) outcomes.  

So where does that leave us? I think, with a caution to both sides. Harper says he will use all legal means to maintain power. But that has its dangers, for both himself and his party (ask Paul Martin) but also for public perceptions of the system as a whole. Just because something is legal doesn’t make it the right thing to do, and nobody like a stickler for the rules. Clinging to power through any means possible can bring the system into disrepute. 

For the coalition: They need to be aware of and sensitive to public opinion. Just because they can take down the government and seize power does not mean it is in their own long term interest (again, for the Libs I think it is a BAD IDEA), and, worse, it might serve to undermine the input-legitimacy of the system in the public mind. That is, the public (e.g. Jon Kay) might look at what is going on and think: Any system that allows this to happen can’t be legitimate. 

There is a lot at stake here. Our parliamentary system is old, established, and far more flexible than people give it credit for. It has consistently given Canadians effective and reasonably stable government while doing so with a large degree of IL and OL (pace Coyne’s distressing habit of declaring our federal elections borderline illegitimate). But every institution has its limits. The more these maniacs twist and pull and bend with no regard for the stresses they are imposing, the more dangerous this all becomes.

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  • http://prairiewrangler.wordpress.com/ Olaf

    Potter,

    I was actually having a discussion along these lines earlier today, however without the scholarly precision. Nice to put some more stable concepts to the ideas. My thanks.

    Also, little more than the predictable contortions of parliament in an extended minority situation

    This was predictable? I don’t know what psychic you frequent, but mine was way off on this one.

  • Mike T.

    Voters upset by the coalition because of any lack of output legitimacy can have input legitimacy when next there is an election, which could be very soon.

  • Andrew Potter

    Well, given how many pundits etc. were basically pleading for the “left” to “unite” in some fashion, it was inevitable, was it not, that eventually even Layton and Dion could take the hint?

  • Ti-Guy

    The distinction is between input legitimacy and output legitimacy.

    Oh, gawd….

  • Stephen B

    When their own power and wellbeing is at issue, politicians generally are willing to let the end justify the means, i.e. favour “output legitimacy” over “input legitimacy”. The political institutions of a mature, sophisticated country have to be able to withstand this. Ours have worked pretty well, but this is a novel situation and they are being tested. I hope the G-G has good advice and good judgement. The Governor-Generalship is an odd constitutional feature, very occasionally of great imprtance, but not normally. You’d almost expect someone like the Chief Justice to be involved at a time like this.

  • http://www.macleansfordummies.wordpress.com Karen Krisfalusi

    A change of comment policy?

    Senates face the same problems acheiving Diversity as do private and institutional boards. Democracy, in it’s most vibrant and inclusive incarnation, reforms private institutions from the inside. As boards become more democratic and inclusive an ethos of democracy will build. Yet the difficulites in attracting and maintaining diversity come from a failure to Invest. That is, if you want someone Poor on your board, in your Senate, you have to willing to train them for the job. The IRPP piece puts alot of thought into Selection and it’s relevance toward evolving Input Legitimacy, but Selection of diversity often fails because there are not enough people whose experience could reform and who also come complete with the requisite skills to participate.

  • Penar Musaraj

    AP,
    Off-topic a little bit, but I’m very curious to know what advice (if any) you would give the GG on the potential Harper request to suspend Parliament until later.

    Say, if you were to think strictly with the good of the country in mind, not in terms of the interests of one party or the other.

  • Mike T.

    Stephen B
    Dec 3, 2008 21:10

    When their own power and wellbeing is at issue, politicians generally are willing to let the end justify the means, i.e. favour “output legitimacy” over “input legitimacy”.

    * * *

    I don’t think this is quite right. Input legitimacy will always exist. “output legitimacy” isn’t favoured over input legitimacy, rather input legitimacy is the bare minimum, but might not always produce output legitimacy. If someone’s “own power and well being” were at issue, a lack of input legitimacy would not merely be a matter to consider, it would be fatal.

  • Karol

    Nomenklatura
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    The nomenklatura were a small, elite subset of the general population in the Canada and other Western Liberal countries who held various key administrative positions in all spheres of those countries’ activity: government, industry, agriculture, education, etc. The nomenklatura was analogous to the ruling class, which Liberal doctrine denounced in the Communist Eastern Bloc.

    Almost without exception, they were members of the Liberal Party. Some authors defined them as a new class. Orthodox Trotskyism utilises the term caste rather than class, because they saw the Canada as a degenerated workers’ state, not a new class society. Later developments of Trotsky’s theories, notably Tony Cliff’s theory of State Capitalism, did refer to the nomenklatura as a new class

    Etymology
    The English term nomenklatura derived from the Latin nomenclatura meaning a list of names.

    Description
    The nomenklatura referred to the Liberal party’s authority to make appointments to key positions throughout the governmental system, as well as throughout the party’s own hierarchy. Specifically, the nomenklatura consisted of two separate lists: one was for key positions, appointments to which were made by authorities within the party; the other was for persons who were potential candidates for appointment to those positions. The Liberal Party of Canada Ottawa Headquarters, as part of its nomenklatura authority, maintained a list of ministerial and ambassadorial positions that it had the power to fill, as well as a separate list of potential candidates to occupy those positions.

    Coextensive with the nomenklatura were patron-client relations. Officials who had the authority to appoint individuals to certain positions cultivated loyalties among those whom they appointed. The patron (the official making the appointment) promoted the interests of clients in return for their support. Powerful patrons, such as the Members of the Parliament, had many clients. Moreover, an official could be both a client (in relation to a higher-level patron) and a patron (to other, lower-level officials).

    Because a client was beholden to his patron for his position, the client was eager to please his patron by carrying out his policies. The Canadian power structure essentially consisted of groups of vassals (clients) who had an overlord (the patron). The higher the patron, the more clients the patron had. Patrons protected their clients and tried to promote their careers. In return for the patron’s efforts to promote their careers, the clients remained loyal to their patron. Thus, by promoting his clients’ careers, the patron could advance his own power.

    The Party’s Appointment Authority
    The nomenklatura system arose early in Canadian history. Pierre Elliot Trudeau wrote that appointments were to take the following criteria into account: reliability, political attitude, qualifications, and administrative ability. Jean Chretien, who was the Leader of Liberal party, also was known as “Comrade File Cabinet” (Tovarishch Kartotekov) for his assiduous attention to the details of the party’s appointments. Seeking to make appointments in a more systematic fashion, Chretien, built the party’s patronage system and used it to distribute his clients throughout the party bureaucracy. Under Chretien’s direction in 1990, the party created departments of the Liberal Party and other organs at lower levels that were responsible for the registration and appointment of party officials. Known as uchraspredy, these organs supervised appointments to important party posts. According to American Canadiologist Seweryn Bialer, after Paul Martin’s accession to power in October 2004, the party considerably expanded its appointment authority. However, in the late 2009s some official statements indicated that the party intended to reduce its appointment authority, particularly in the area of economic management, in line with Dion’s reform efforts.

    At the federal level, the Party Building and Cadre Work Department supervised party nomenklatura appointments. This department maintained records on party members throughout the country, made appointments to positions on the federal level, and approved nomenklatura appointments on the lower levels of the hierarchy. The head of this department sometimes was a member of the Liberal caucus and was often a protégé of the leader of Liberal party.

    Every party committee and party organizational department–from the federal level in Ottawa to the district and city levels– prepared two lists according to their needs. The basic nominated position list detailed positions in the political, administrative, economic, military, cultural, and educational bureaucracies that the committee and its department had responsibility for filling. The registered enumerated the persons suitable for these positions.

    Patron-Client Relations
    An official in the party or government bureaucracy could not advance in the nomenklatura without the assistance of a patron. In return for this assistance in promoting his career, the client carried out the policies of the patron. Patron-client relations thus help to explain the ability of party leaders to generate support for their policies. The presence of patron-client relations between party officials and officials in other bureaucracies also helped to account for the control the party exercised over Canadian society. All of the half a million members of the nomenklatura system understood that they held their positions as a result of a favor bestowed on them by a superior official in the party, and that they could be replaced if they manifested disloyalty to their patron. Self-interest dictated that members of the nomenklatura submit to the control of their patrons in the party.

    Clients sometimes could attempt to supplant their patron. For example, Paul Martin, one of Desmeralis’ former protégés, helped to oust the latter in Jean Chetien in 2004. The power of the Liberal leader was consolidated to the extent that he placed his clients in positions of power and influence. The ideal for the Liberal leader, writes Canadian émigré observer (name withheld)is to be overlord of vassals selected by oneself.”

    Several factors explain the entrenchment of patron-client relations. First, in a centralized nondemocratic government system, promotion in the bureaucratic-political hierarchy was the only path to power. Second, the most important criterion for promotion in this hierarchy was approval from one’s supervisors, who evaluated their subordinates on the basis of political criteria and their ability to contribute to the fulfillment of the economic plan. Third, political rivalries were present at all levels of the party and state bureaucracies but were especially prevalent at the top. Power and influence decided the outcomes of these struggles, and the number and positions of one’s clients were critical components of that power and influence. Fourth, because fulfillment of the economic plan was decisive, systemic pressures led officials to conspire together and use their ties to achieve that goal.

    The faction led by Paul Martin provides a good case study of patron-client relations in the Canadian system. Many members of the Martin’s faction came from Power Corporation see Ezra Levant’s .Maurice Strong article published on.December 2, 2002

    Patron-client relations had implications for policy making in the party and government bureaucracies. Promotion of trusted subordinates into influential positions facilitated policy formation and policy execution. A network of clients helped to ensure that a patron’s policies could be carried out. In addition, patrons relied on their clients to provide an accurate flow of information on events throughout the country. This information assisted policymakers in ensuring that their programs were being implemented.

    The New Class
    Milovan Djilas wrote of the nomenklatura as the new class in his book New Class: An Analysis of the Canadian Socialist System, and that it was widely seen (and resented) by ordinary citizens as a bureaucratic élite that enjoyed special privileges and had simply supplanted the earlier wealthy capitalist élites.

  • Coyne Crisis

    Karol: I can’t decide. Are you an idiot or a retard?

  • hazzard

    Andrew could you kindly enlighten me as to the general split between left leaning and centre leaning liberals within the party both now and during the Chretien years? It seems to me they had a pretty successful formula back then and I’m wondering which was the aberation. Which Liberal party is the real Liberal party?

  • Karol

    Coyne Crisis
    You seem to be facing serious dilema but I cannot help you with it.

  • Sisyphus

    Whatever will we do without your help ??

  • Meany

    Well, in my personal opinion, Parliament has lost much “Input Legitimacy”.

    In my opinion, if we are going to stick with this traditional Westminister model of Parliament, then we should also stick with the traditional manner of selecting Prime Ministers: First minister, selected from his caucus or the House. Instead, we have these external party leadership conventions select all powerful Leaders, which then have complete control over their caucus, and have command over Parliament in ways which other leaders in similar systems would only dream of. Really, we have a hybrid Republican/American and Westminister model.

    This has changed democracy in a fundamental way, in that now in most elections, when deciding where to place their vote, in order of importance, Canadians look to:
    1. Leader
    2. Party
    3. Local Candidate

    In the traditional system, it’s the other way around. In this coalition, we are going to put in a Prime Minister based on it being the other way around, based on the logic that we have more individual members who support Dion than Harper. But I would make the counter argument in that we have a political system that is about to place in a Prime Minister who was soundly rejected by the country, by 8/10 regions of Canada, and by his own party. It’s absurd.
    That being said, I think it’s obvious that Harper is done, but now I’m in Kay’s corner. Where can I sign up to be a Republicanist? No more of this garbage instable political system. Whatever happens in this short term political drama is of secondary importance to reforming our political system, which quite frankly, I’m not so sure I am proud of anymore.

  • Francien Verhoeven

    “Which Liberal party is the real Liberal party?”

    The party that hasn’t gotten over its longstanding, now divorced, marriage with the people of Quebec.

    The divorce happened some years back, but the Liberals don’t quite realize that. Now they are courting the single minded Quebec dame.

  • Stephen B

    I haven’t read the paper and my remark was a little flip.

    Mr. Potter says, ” Clinging to power through any means possible can bring the system into disrepute. ” My point, for whatever it’s worth, was that politicians frequently try to promote their own interests by means that can bring the system into disrepute. They often confuse their own interest and the public interest.

  • Francien Verhoeven

    Meany,

    “That being said, I think it’s obvious that Harper is done”

    I think Harper has just discovered his second wind. Now he is able to talk much more openly about things that could never be said, such as:

    our current electoral system does not work.

    Let us institute that parties must be running a federal campaign when running in a federal election, for instance. We could demand that any federal party running in a federal election should at least field 150 candidates across the country.

  • http://potter kc

    Karol.
    If this is what passed for political debate in the east i’m surprised that they dian’t't only just reject communism, i’m surprised the didn’ all commit mass suicide. I dare you to repeat it. On 2nd thought don’t – it might ggive me ideas.

  • http://potter kc

    Karol.
    If this is what passed for political debate in the east i’m surprised that they didn’t't only just reject communism, i’m surprised the didn’ all commit mass suicide. I dare you to repeat it. On 2nd thought don’t – it might ggive me ideas.

  • Francien Verhoeven

    “They often confuse their own interest and the public interest.”

    But if all is based on reason, good solid reason, then the interest of the country AND their own interests are secured. For in the end, solid reasoning cannot refute either.

    Good, solid reasoning is what this country is in need of.

  • Bruno Hildebrando

    Andrew,

    excelent article, very informative.

    Bsrgds,

    Bruno

  • Rich

    “the requirement, ultimately, that the output of an institution be acceptable to the people”

    What nonsense. So if we don’t like the outcome then the process must be flawed, right? This is the same logic used to justify repeated referenda on Quebec sovereignty – the people still haven’t voted the right way yet so we better keep holding votes until they do.

    Democracy is messy. It’s not designed to produce optimal results; it reflects a wide variety of interests and opinions. Democracy is based on process and inputs – everyone gets their say and the system TRIES to produce reasonably acceptable outcomes if possible but this is part is of far less importance. Isn’t this the reason we have separatist MP’s in Parliament, even once forming the official Opposition? To most Canadians, myself included, this result is abhorrent but we abide by it because it was the result of a legitimate and legal democratic process.

    The Opposition has every right to declare non-confidence in the government and attempt to replace it through democratic channels. If they piss off voters in the process the voters will surely have their chance to say so at the ballot box in the not-too-distant future.

  • Rich

    I should add that if you’re focused on institutional outputs for my money you can’t beat a good dictatorship. This would neatly avoid all those pesky problems I heard about tonight on the news during their “person-on-the-street” interviews:

    - Stability, stability, stability
    - No partisan bickering
    - The ability to govern swiftly and decisively

  • Karol

    kc,
    There were some significant changes in Nomenclatura system ever since Liberal Party of Canada was taken over by sexual deviants (LGBT lobby). I did not want to post this updated version as it would tend to offend some people but if replace traditional patron-client subservience and power play with homosexual struggle for domination in multipartner sexual relationships (who does whom when and why) than you will get a picture.

  • seaandthemountains

    Andrew,

    I agree that this is a helpful way to think about legitimacy of institutions. But lets isolate your arguement for a minute.

    “…I’m inclined to think that output legitimacy has priority. That is, a certain institutional design will only be (input) legitimate to the extent to which it tends on the whole (note the hedging here) to produce acceptable (that is, output-legitimate) outcomes.”

    I do note the hedging. But I think it is key to the arguement and the implication.

    If we are to say that outcomes legitimate institutions, then how far from an institution can we deviate, and still end up with an outcome we like and still call something legitimate? The full extension, of course (and to be clear you are clearly not advocating it, but it is still implicated) that anything goes and as long as the outcome is acceptable then all is ‘good’.

    Of course the opposite is likely equally abhorrent. If we do everything by the ‘institution’ then and we get terrible results over and over again then so be it? Hopefully not. Evolution is important.

    Two sets of questions emerge for me.

    1) Are there certain institutions that we ought to experiment or seek to change less because they are purposefully put into place to protect more ‘sacred’ values? If so how do we determine which?

    2) More generally, how do we determine when institutions need to change? And what should the process be for identifying them? And what should be the process for changing them be? Also how often should we be looking to update out institutions? Every time we don’t like the outcome?

    It really leads me to wonder about, do institutions not reflect some greater value that we want to ensure has longer-term longevity than people’s instrumental preferences?

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