The rise of ‘Talqaeda’

Defending the new system, one of the new judges claims that sharia has been unjustly maligned in the West. “Cutting off the right hand of a thief is correct Islamic punishment,” says Ehsan ur Rehman, 41. “But it’s a last-case scenario. It could happen, but I doubt you’ll see it.” As for women, there is no moderation, he adds. They must be covered at all times and accompanied by a male family member when outside the home. If an unmarried woman is caught having sex, the penalty is 50 lashes, and for adultery, death by stoning. A clash seems inevitable, pitting the mild form of sharia that the locals want against a system similar to the barbarism that Afghans were subjected to under Taliban rule.

In defending the deal in Swat, Pakistani authorities have talked about this being a dialogue with the “moderate Taliban,” a phrase coined by Western leaders who believe there are elements among the militants whom they can bring to the negotiating table in Afghanistan. The argument behind talking to this so-called moderate Taliban is based on pursuing what virtually every military strategist will say is the key element of fighting a counter-insurgency, or what Jonathan Schell, a respected war historian and author, calls “people’s war”: winning hearts and minds. According to this school of thought, the vast majority of Pashtuns, the ethnic group from which most of the Taliban are drawn, do not subscribe to global jihad. These fighters are men from the wilds of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal interior, fighting what is for them, at least partly, a cultural war to preserve the Pashtun way of life: an ultra-conservative blend of Islam and tribal customs. No one from the U.S. or NATO is going to convince these people that their culture is not under threat (indeed, Pakistanis and Afghans have failed to do so). What’s needed are intermediaries—in other words, “moderate Taliban”—and concessions, for example the institution of some form of sharia.

Swat is the testing ground for this approach. The Obama administration, which has ordered another 17,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan, has admitted as much, saying that it will see how the peace deal in Swat and the implementation of sharia law plays out before deciding if a similar approach can be applied to Afghanistan. The French foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, appears to have gone a step further, acknowledging the possibility of a strong Taliban political presence in Afghanistan. “If the nationalist Taliban come to power through the vote and accept the constitution, that is the Afghans’ business,” he told Le Figaro on March 9. “What we cannot accept is support for international jihad.”

No one, from the Pakistani government to the U.S. administration, is talking about cozying up to global jihadists. Instead, the logic behind the Swat deal is to offer some militants, namely the “moderate” SufiMuhammad and his TNSM, the opportunity to join the political process. But Muhammad doesn’t appear to be working with the same playbook. Based on his vision for Swat, moderation appears to be only a cover for religious authoritarianism—and jihad, although he keeps silent about that. His ties to al-Qaeda are well-established. Indeed, Pakistan’s decision to negotiate with him highlights how difficult finding moderates will be: the key hurdle, possibly insurmountable, is that while there may indeed be “moderate” or “nationalist” Taliban, the movement itself has become deeply, and perhaps irrevocably, intertwined with the al-Qaeda-inspired global jihadist movement—and is now better described as Talqaeda. That is what is now in the process of being established on Pakistani territory, and from there it can potentially intensify its jihad in Afghanistan and around the world.

The likelihood of that happening is very real, given that the Taliban are still being supported by powerful elements in Pakistan’s military establishment. According to local ISI sources in Swat, who spoke to Maclean’s on condition of anonymity, the deal with the TNSM as well as the agreements in other parts of Pakistan’s tribal belt are part of a larger ISI-led plan to re-establish strategic depth in Afghanistan. Since the fall of the Taliban regime there, the ISI has been looking for a new ally that would counter rising Indian influence with the Karzai government in Kabul. The TNSM represents that ally. “How do you think the TNSM fighters got to Afghanistan?” says one of the sources with close ties to the TNSM, referring to the ill-fated mission led by Muhammad at the start of the Afghan war. “How do you think the leadership managed to make it back alive? The ISI has always had close ties with them.”

The common belief in Pakistani military circles, as many Western diplomats have also come to believe, is that the Taliban will eventually have to play a role in the future of Afghan politics. The situation would be much the same as in Iraq, where the former Baath party has been brought back into the political fold, albeit under a different name, the Sunni Awakening—ushering in some measure of peace there. (It’s no accident that Gen. David Petraeus, the architect of the U.S. successful counter-insurgency strategy in Iraq, is now hard at work deciphering the Afghan puzzle.) If and when those elements enter the Afghan political arena, Pakistan wants to be sure it will have some leverage with them.

It’s an old and risky game, considering the current Taliban-al-Qaeda nexus. And what’s most interesting about the Swat deal is not what is present in the text but what is omitted: it does not require the TNSM to halt its support for Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. Indeed, what it does do is free up its own fighters, now hardened and experienced after two years of battling the Pakistani military, to carry the war across the border. Similarly, an agreement between opposing Taliban factions in the North and South Waziristan Tribal Areas suggests that the strategic shift is not limited to the Swati militants. The rapprochement between Baitullah Mehsud, a Pakistani Taliban warlord and target of recent U.S. drone attacks, and his rivals, Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur (both of whom had signed peace deals with the Pakistani government), points to a larger Taliban objective. Indeed, a recent announcement from Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar asking the Pakistani Taliban to stop fighting Pakistani authorities and focus its attention on Afghanistan adds some credence to the speculation that the Taliban, with the aid of the ISI, is preparing for a major showdown with coalition troops.

In Swat, the TNSM militants will not be drawn into admitting that they will join the fight in Afghanistan. They do, however, voice their support for the Afghan jihad. “Our brothers there are suffering like us,” Muhammad says, adding ominously that the Afghan war is a valid jihad, which would imply that under his belief system all Muslims are required by Islamic law to go there and fight. By reining in his son-in-law in Swat, Muhammad appears to be falling in line with the overall Taliban strategy. “The jihad in Pakistan has been destructive to our cause,” he says. “Muslims have enough enemies; we should not be fighting each other.”

While Muhammad does not openly address the issue of global jihad, some of his supporters are less circumspect about their overarching mission. “I’ll tell you how we can end this war,” says Khan, the senior aide. “If we can get our men close to the U.S., in Venezuela, or Brazil, or Canada, and attack them from there, then they will stop attacking us.” Among the TNSM, there are already men who operate clandestinely, shaving off their beards and donning Western clothes.

Is this the new face of the Talqaeda of future global jihad, with Pakistan as its home turf? For Sufi Muhammad, it seems, an al-Qaeda-inspired jihad is his new mission: Swat first, then Pakistan, then the world. “My work has not finished,” he says. “My work has only begun.”