The U.S. Chinook helicopters from Task Force Wings’ 4th Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment, clawed for altitude as they departed from Forward Operating Base Ramrod in Maywand district of Kandahar, jammed with American, Afghan and Canadian soldiers. Apache gunships pulled tight turns above, deterring any nearby Taliban from engaging the force. The crews from a detachment of Canadian M-777 artillery pulled the canvas covers off the barrels, checked their ammunition and prepared to drop smoke or high-explosive rounds. The female gunner in one of the Chinooks, her faceplate painted to resemble a pair of bright red Rocky Horror Picture Show lips, tested her machine gun with a few short bursts. Her partner, with a smiling Japanese demon painted on his, did the same. In minutes, the aerial force swooped low over the Dasht, a prairie-like area in Maywand district west of Kandahar city, and made its run into western Zharey district just as the sun came up. Involving one of the largest air assault operations in Afghanistan since 2003, Canadian-commanded Operation Jalay was on.
The Chinooks flared in to the landing zone, and the troops poured out as the rear ramp dropped. The helicopters lifted off, showering the troops with dust and rocks. Shouted commands got the soldiers off their feet, loads adjusted, and moving out of the open as quickly as possible. Further east, Canadians from 3rd Battalion, the Royal Canadian Regiment, led by Lt.-Col Roger Barrett, crossed the Arghandab riverbed on foot, while an armoured force from the Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians) pressed in from the north. The sudden, three-pronged attack shocked enemy leaders. Instead of engaging the Canadian and American force, the insurgents went to ground and tried to get out of the area on foot, abandoning their weapons and caching their equipment—leaving IEDs behind which later killed three personnel.
A larger force of U.S. troops is now on the way to Kandahar province—17,000 to possibly 30,000 troops throughout 2009. But as Operation Jalay showed in March, what has mistakenly been called a “surge,” and simplistically compared to American operations in Iraq, actually started much earlier in the Canadian sector. 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry of the U.S. Army, led by Lt.-Col. Dan Hurlbut, now holds a special place in Canadian military history: it is the first American military unit to operate under Canadian command in Afghanistan for a protracted period. Unofficially dubbed the “Manley Battalion” because it was offered up by the Pentagon in response to the 2008 Manley report calling for more international troops, 2-2 Infantry entered into its special relationship with Task Force Kandahar in the early winter of 2008. 2-2 Infantry was a bit of an orphan at first. Detached from its parent American brigade in Regional Command (East) of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the battalion did not come fully equipped. In a role reversal, Task Force Kandahar found itself helping Americans. The Americans provided the infantry, Canada provided the “enablers.”
Operation Jalay, commanded by Canadian Brig.-Gen. Jonathan Vance and planned by his staff at Task Force Kandahar, was one example of the close co-operation between Canadian and American forces achieved after months of work. I first met Lt.-Col. Hurlbut last year when his staff arrived and was getting oriented. They were going into Maywand district, an area that I had been in previously with the 1st Battalion, Royal Gurkha Rifles. In weeks, 2-2 Infantry was dug in next to their vehicles on the Dasht west of Hutel, waiting for engineers to arrive and construct their new home, Forward Operating Base Ramrod. There was some initial trepidation in the Canadian camp: would these guys try to template Iraq onto Afghanistan? Would they use fire indiscriminately and alienate the Afghan population? Nobody was sure. There was a shaking-out period when 2-2 Infantry was subjected to IED attacks on deployment, but concerns melted away once the battalion acclimatized to Maywand—and to the Canadians in Task Force Kandahar. “I would characterize the issues we had with [Task Force Kandahar] and the Canadian battalions we worked with as normal issues that two different organizations will have,” Hurlbut later said. In other words, no big deal.
2-2 Infantry’s deployment is just the tip of the iceberg. Close on its heels was the insertion of the 3,000-man 3rd Brigade Combat Team from the 10th Mountain Division into Logar and Wardak provinces in January to stabilize the southern approaches to the Afghan capital, Kabul. It’s a region where suicide bombers entered the city via safe-house “rat lines.” As part of their pre-deployment training, staff from the 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry of the 10th Mountain Division, benefited from Canadian “lessons learned.” Their operating area, Wardak province, is essentially in the same state Kandahar province was in 2005, in terms of governance and coordination between the reconstruction teams, military forces, and police forces.
2-87 Infantry’s personnel, many of whom have substantial Afghan experience from the early days of the war, realize that the counterinsurgency fight is different this time. Lt.-Col. Kimo Gallahue, 2-87 Infantry’s commander, and Lt.-Col. Michael Gabel from 4th Battalion, 25th Artillery Regiment, both emphasize that “we know this isn’t Iraq.” A host of new programs, including the Afghan Public Protection Force, whereby local Afghans become responsible for their own security working alongside the steadily improving police, are being implemented in Wardak under the scrutiny of 2-87 Infantry and 4-25 Artillery.
But what of Kandahar province? The number of Americans deploying to the Canadian-controlled zone is not yet in the public domain, but the influx is expected to dwarf the Canadian contribution. This poses several problems for Canada. Because Canada historically contributes comparatively modest resources to any coalition endeavour, it generally seeks out roles and missions or deploys unique capabilities that are “salient”—meaning that they impart a combination of influence, prestige and rank to Canada’s status within the Western coalitions. That was one reason why Canada deployed to Kandahar in the first place in 2005. Canada maintained “saliency” by holding the line in and around Kandahar in the dangerous days of 2006 and 2007—when the Europeans generally wouldn’t come to help, the British were pinned down in neighbouring Helmand province, and the Americans were stretched thin everywhere else.
Prestige is one of those intangible things connected to national pride, particularly for our soldiers who have been fighting, and dying, in Afghanistan. We are in danger of losing our profile with the influx of American forces if Canada doesn’t play its cards right. On one hand, the American presence is more than welcome—Canada has been holding the thin red line for several years now. On the other hand, we have to avoid the narrative that Canada screwed up and the Americans are riding to the rescue, one that has started to emerge in some American policy circles.
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