This does not mean that a power struggle is unfolding between Putin and Medvedev. “There is no sense that there is any rivalry or tension,” says Clifford Gaddy, a Russia specialist at the Brookings Institution. “From the beginning, it’s been understood that Medvedev is one of a team. He’s never been anything except an ally and protege of Putin. The legitimacy that Medvedev had initially is solely because he was chosen by Putin. Putin could have chosen his horse.”
Mankoff suspects that Putin and Medvedev worked out an arrangement before Putin endorsed Medvedev to ensure the smooth running of the new administration. Early hopes that Medvedev might be more liberal than Putin have faded. Medvedev has “better table manners,” Aurel Braun says, meaning he sometimes takes on the role of the good cop in Russia’s relations with the outside world. But on substantial issues, such as Russia’s still-simmering standoff with Georgia, or its stance toward NATO’s potential expansion, the two think as one. They both believe in a resurgent Russia that is respected and, preferably, feared.
And if an issue were to divide them, Medvedev is in no position to challenge his supposed subordinate. “He has not developed a substantial power base,” says Braun. “Even if Medvedev were a genuine liberal democrat, he hasn’t shown the inclination to acquire the power to challenge Putin. He does not have the political will to push for the kind of network, the kind of power building, that would be necessary.”
This has caused many to think that Medvedev is little more than a placeholder for Putin. Russia’s constitution did not permit Putin to run for a third consecutive term as president—and, to Putin’s credit, he did not try to amend this—but he will be allowed to run again in 2012.
Putin hasn’t ruled this out, but it’s not a sure thing. “I think it will partly be determined by how well the duopoly that you see now works,” says Braun. “There is a tradition going back to Soviet days where you did not need to have the most visible office, or what constitutionally appeared to be the most powerful office, to have the greatest power. So if he finds that he can do all he wants, and the routine work is done by Medvedev, then he might be satisfied with this arrangement.”
For Putin, there are advantages to running a country without being its official head of state. According to a Kremlin insider who spoke to Clifford Gaddy, Putin doesn’t like to drink tea with foreign dignitaries. Now that’s Medvedev’s job.
But what seems clear is that Putin doesn’t intend to let go of the reins. He transformed Russia after the shambling, chaotic, but comparatively democratic presidency of Boris Yeltsin. It’s an ongoing process, and he doesn’t want to see it stalled on another man’s watch.
Putin is also surely aware that Russia will encounter more storms in its immediate future. Its relationship with Georgia remains extremely tense. War may break out again between the two nations, and Putin will not be happy as long as his nemesis, Mikheil Saakashvili, remains president there. Ukraine, a country that was part of the Soviet Union for decades, is tilting toward the West. Putin would like to bring it back into Russia’s orbit. And Russia has still not diversified its economy, leaving it vulnerable to dropping oil prices.
“Putin regards today’s Russia as essentially his project,” says Gaddy. “He didn’t take over from anybody else. He saved Russia, he thinks—and there are some good reasons to agree—and what has happened since 1999 is thanks to him, and his insights and his brilliance and how he set up a particular kind of system for controlling the whole operation. So what he absolutely doesn’t want is for the whole thing to crumble in the hands of someone who is either not as smart as he is, not as competent as he is, or not as ruthless and powerful.”
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