Fair enough, President Obama or French President Nicolas Sarkozy might say. We wish Iran were democratic, too. But it’s not. And in the meantime Iran’s nuclear program is not something we can safely ignore.
This is true. According to Byman, it is unlikely that Iran would launch an unprovoked strike against Israel or the United States, or that it would give nuclear technology to a terrorist group. But the repercussions would still be severe. With a nuclear umbrella protecting it, Iran would be emboldened to extend its influence in Afghanistan and Iraq, and through its proxies Hamas and Hezbollah in the Levant. Iran’s neighbours and adversaries in the Middle East, particularly Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, would feel threatened and might reason that they too must acquire nuclear weapons to protect themselves. So even if Iran’s nuclear program can only be stalled, the ramifications of a nuclear Iran are sufficiently dire that playing for time is a better option than doing nothing.
But those countries negotiating with Iran should also consider that the nuclear issue is a powerful propaganda tool for Iranian hard-liners at a moment when the Islamic regime is weaker than it has been for decades. “The nuclear issue has been presented to the Iranian public as the right of Iran to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. And Western attempts to prevent Iran from acquiring that capability have been portrayed as attacks on Iran’s sovereignty and attempts to keep Iran backwards and dependent on the West,” says Akhavan. “Iranians have a strong sense of national identity. They have memories of imperial domination by the British and the Russians, and of America’s role in the 1953 coup d’état against [former prime minister Mohammad] Mosaddeq. The regime is playing to that sentiment.”
It’s a public relations ploy with limited appeal. Saeed Rahnema, a professor of political science at York University, says that most Iranians are concerned about political freedoms, education, and economic opportunities rather than Iran’s nuclear capability—an assessment that is echoed by Arash Azizi, an Iranian journalist who recently immigrated to Canada. Still, according to Djavad Salahi-Isfahani, a research fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “Iranians generally rally to the side of the government when the United States and the French say unreasonable things. And most Iranians know that what Iran is doing, Brazil is doing as well.”
None of this is to suggest that Iran’s nuclear program isn’t important—only that it is not the most important thing happening in Iran right now. What will ultimately matter more to Iran’s future, and the future of Iran’s relationship with the rest of the world, is the fracturing of Iran’s power structure, the emergence of the Revolutionary Guards as the dominant pro-government force in the country, and the continued resilience of Iran’s democratic opposition.
The Islamic Republic, in short, is in turmoil. And where it can be most effectively challenged is not over nuclear weapons but its democratic legitimacy and the rights of its citizens. These are issues on which the United States and its Western allies can assert their values and count on a greater degree of support from Iranian citizens themselves.
“There should always be room for dialogue, but I think that when the nuclear issue becomes the focal point, that is a mistake,” says Akhavan. He notes that international travel bans and asset freezes have been directed against individuals and institutions linked to Iran’s nuclear program, not to the ongoing human rights abuses that matter much more to people inside Iran. “People are saying, ‘What about crimes against humanity? What about leaders that are responsible for murders and torture and rape? Why do we not have targeted sanctions against them? Why is everyone worried about the nuclear issue and the question of oil supplies, but nobody is worried about our struggle?’ ”
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