Q: But isn’t it inevitable that we deal with the Taliban? And maybe even cede them part or all of the country?
A: No. It’s inevitable that some people from the Taliban will become engaged and get involved in the political process, just as happened in Northern Ireland. But I don’t think it’s inevitable that you’d cede a part of the country to the Taliban. Do you say, “This part of Afghanistan is free and equal, but in Kandahar province you’re allowed to whip women because they have fingernail polish on, or their shoes make a clicking noise on the cobblestones”? I fail to see how we, as a nation that’s a leader, could support something like that.
Q: Why has the Taliban made such a comeback in Afghanistan?
A: The intensity of [the U.S.] focus on Afghanistan started to dissipate after the successful campaign against the Taliban in late 2001, early 2002. All of a sudden the U.S. focus, including American forces and intelligence, shifted to Iraq. So [the Taliban] had a bit of a breather, they weren’t being as directly targeted, they had time to rest and regroup. Then in late ’03, insurgents started taking on the large U.S. military machine in Iraq, using IEDs and suicide bombers, and having some success. That gave the Taliban hope, they started to recruit more people and make more attacks, and in turn that brought in more money from the Arab world, so they started rebuilding to move back in [to Afghanistan]. That culminated around 2006. The second aspect is that NATO’s strategy was incremental and therefore not conducive to keeping the Taliban off balance.
Q: So was it a mistake for Canada to reduce its military presence in Afghanistan between 2004 and 2006?
A: Probably the finger should be pointed at me for blame on that one. [As head of the army at the time] I successfully argued that we should reduce because the army was being run pretty hard and we hadn’t really set ourselves up to do that. That was the biggest strategic error, in hindsight, that I believe I made, because as soon as we went into operational pause, the urgency of getting the army up to speed and re-equipped and getting the units full of soldiers all disappeared. And the government got used to not paying the operational costs, which in any mission are going to be plus a billion dollars, so when we went back to it, that shock of the operational cost was big. But I’m not sure we had the ability to effectively have a presence on the ground there.
Q: NATO’s new commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, is warning of “mission failure” without an additional 40,000 troops.
A: What he’s broadcast is a very commonsense, pragmatic number, focused on the south because that’s where the threat is. My hat’s off to him. But there is more to it than just troops, which Stan McChrystal understands really well. There are so many different countries providing reconstruction funds, and much of it is not as coherent as it should be to provide the big bang effect. Two, building a government that actually works is a piece of it, for sure, and Afghanistan really has a challenge because most of the folks with any experience building a government are either dead or living in the West, after 35 years of brutality.
Q: What do you think of Biden’s plan to scale back U.S. forces in Afghanistan and focus more on rooting out al-Qaeda there and in Pakistan?
A: Before [9/11], al-Qaeda found a home inside the Taliban-dominated part of Afghanistan to regroup, plan, prepare, train and project from, and that’s what allowed them to be successful in some of their efforts worldwide. If you’re trying to get rid of that petri dish that allowed terrorists to grow, you have to approach the entity rather than just go after the terrorists themselves.
Q: If Obama decides against sending more troops to Afghanistan, will the Canadian mission have been in vain?
A: Not at all. The men and women from our country have been there to help Afghans who needed some help. You talk to every single man or woman who’s been there, and almost to a person you hear that they believe in their mission and continue to support it.
Q: Given widespread fraud in the recent elections, was President Karzai the wrong guy for us to back?
A: I think he was absolutely the right individual to coalesce Afghans and the international community in support of Afghans in 2001. But the Karzai administration appears to have a great deal of difficulty building an effective government structure that can deliver routinely what the Afghan people want and need. Obviously, given the number of contenders he had, and the results on the election side, [he] may not be the right long-term solution.
Q: Speaking of elections, have you definitively ruled out a run for office?
A: Yes, I have.
Q: You’re known for being tough and outspoken, but you mention tears quite often in the book. Are you really a softie?
A: Yeah, I probably am. But I’ll tell you one thing, when you have young men and women in combat operations and they lose their friends, one thing you quickly learn not to be ashamed of is tears.
Pages: 1 2
