Coyne: Chris, the Prime Minister used to say we can’t set arbitrary deadlines. Now it seems like he’s setting an arbitrary deadline of 2011. Is that tenable?
Alexander: Parliament has passed a motion. That motion is being respected by all parties, but the debate is happening in Washington, in Brussels, in Afghanistan itself, and Canadian debate needs to be connected to all of those other debates. President Karzai is debating, in advance of his inauguration next week, what the priorities will be for his government in 2010. President Obama is debating how to prosecute counter-insurgency on a scale the U.S. has never yet done in Afghanistan. Those decisions will be very important for everyone. So we mustn’t turn this 2011 deadline into a shibboleth—there’s lots of room for debate. The Prime Minister—and many others—have agreed that our engagement must continue in some key areas, and we should look at what’s needed.
Taylor: This idea that it takes time to build institutions—I mean, it’s been eight years. The Afghans know how to fight, and we’re not creating an institution that’s going to have to go out and fight a First World nation with armoured warfare. If we can get them convinced that there is a reason for them to fight for a better Afghanistan, we’re on the way to success. Unfortunately, we sort of handed our coat to the Afghan forces and took on the fight ourself and forgot that, no, in fact this isn’t our fight. Ultimately it’s going to be an Afghan solution in Afghanistan, and that’s where the solution has to come first.
Stephenson: If we pulled out at this point they wouldn’t be capable of fighting on their own, and that’s part of the critical need to be there. The Canadian Forces don’t conduct operations in Kandahar without their Afghan army partners. When we go into these village projects we’re talking about, the Afghan army is actually the one repelling the Taliban attacks. But if you simply say, “Look, we’re done, this is too difficult, we’re not going to stick around,” why would they want to fight for you? Of course they won’t. And so you do have to work with them.
Wells: Does anyone believe that development work can continue in the south without military escort and a battle group in the neighbourhood?
Stephenson: I’m deeply concerned about the future of not only Afghanistan but the region and Pakistan if NATO goes home. Start with Afghanistan. What happens to all of the people who co-operated with the West? They get wiped out, so we’re abdicating our responsibility to people we’re now leaving at the hands of the Taliban. Would the Taliban expand out across Afghanistan? Likely, because they’re far more aggressive than the other groups. Would they necessarily march back to Kabul? Worst case scenario, yes. Even worst case than that, perhaps, is another civil war.
Looking at Pakistan, what is the message that is sent to Pakistan, the critical piece of the puzzle? This is a country that is highly destabilized, that has nuclear weapons, and al-Qaeda and jihadists. If we say we’re not committed to Afghanistan, but by the way, Pakistan, we’d really like you to take care of those al-Qaeda guys, why would the Pakistani government put these kinds of resources into undermining a movement that, in many ways, has served their strategic interests, if the West isn’t serious about fighting it?
Wells: It’s refreshing to hear commentators discovering that there are repercussions for Pakistan in the international jihad. It was the factory where it was produced for 20 years and no one said boo. And it’s refreshing to hear people say, “Well, that damned Iraq war has been under-resourcing Afghanistan,” especially people who spent half a decade cheerleading the Iraq war.
Coyne: But likewise, the people who are now saying, “we can’t win, this is a quagmire,” were saying the same thing in 2006 in Iraq before the surge, and the surge worked. So if a change in strategy worked then, why are we running up the white flag now before we’ve even made the change in strategy?
