In Afganistan the final battle begins

Paul Wells: This time the tactics are different and backup has arrived

by Paul Wells on Friday, April 16, 2010 10:10am - 57 Comments

Canadian money built and opened that school, but Canadian troops were not around to defend it when the Taliban booby-trapped it in 2006 and left letters saying anyone who tried to take it back would be murdered. If Dog Company takes the school back, sooner or later the insurgents will do the same. What’s needed is a commitment from the Afghan government to keep it open, backed by Afghan National Army troops who will be vigilant long after Jeremiah Ellis goes home.
He’s pleaded for help, he told Leslie. The Afghan police, poorly equipped and often corrupt, have been no help. “They’d show up, kick a dog, steal an apple, not do much.” It’s the Afghan army, rapidly growing and professionalizing, that’s needed. “Until then, that school sits as a monument,” Ellis said. “It sits there as a monument to the fact that their government won’t do anything for them.”

This conviction that the first job of soldiers is to vouchsafe the essentials of a civil society was clear everywhere we travelled. Near the village of Nakhonay we visited Combat Outpost Shkarre, built around a single-storey building of dried mud and grass the Taliban were using, only months ago, as an outpost to trigger roadside bombs to destroy passing traffic.

The soldiers of Delta Company’s 11 Platoon have only lately installed working hot showers in the yard. Our convoy stayed overnight, sleeping on cots under the stars. For Capt. James O’Neill, 11 Platoon’s commander, the main goal is to keep local “FAMs”—fighting-age males in their late teens and twenties—busy with construction and irrigation projects so life in the area would improve and the FAMs would be harder to lure into the insurgency.

“I remember when I was in work-up training, thinking, ‘What is this COIN shit?,’ ” O’Neill said, using military slang for counterinsurgency. “I’d say, ‘We’re Canadian Forces, let’s just kill the enemy.’ ” But these days the overwhelming majority of IEDs Delta Company disposes in the area are those turned in by local residents. That only happens because the Canadian soldiers and the villagers have worked together and grown to trust one another. It makes everybody safer.

Menard’s enthusiasm for the strategy of keeping on the population’s good side is endless. He’s poured huge resources into basic irrigation and road building. “You’ve seen water like probably you’ve never seen in the past,” he said, referring to the reappearance after many years’ absence of verdant farmlands in Arghandab, just north of Kandahar. “I’m still digging and clearing canals so that farmers can have some water so they can farm. It’s as simple as this. I’m trying to give the obvious a big place. I’m not suggesting this is very brilliant. But that’s what I’m doing and it’s working. We are in a position now to reinforce what they want. They’re not after, you know, solar-powered lights or whatever. They want water.”

The focus on the population is also driving the ISAF forces to push their presence from the big camps into smaller outposts closer to the people. That’s the first point Menard always emphasizes: “Live among the population and protect them day and night.” This carries some risk. Instead of arming to the teeth every time they go out, soldiers are more often leaving helmets and body armour aside as they participate in shuras with local district leaders and elders. But that builds trust and, sometimes, genuine co-operation.

Menard ran down a list of the other elements of his command philosophy. “Persistent, partnered presence.” No more of the “whack-a-mole” Canadian forces participated in for so long, where they would show up just long enough to beat down a sudden outcropping of insurgent violence, only to leave for another crisis zone and allow the Taliban to rebuild where they’d just been flushed out.

Instead, Menard has established two main geographic zones extending around Kandahar City. Closest to the hub is a “ring of stability,” in which ISAF forces and the Afghan government work together to ensure something like an ordinary life for a majority of the province’s population. “Creating an environment where people can be employed, sell their products, do their farming, have an alternative to what they know right now,” Menard said. Further out is a “ring of security,” in more sparsely populated terrain, where the coalition has been fighting the Taliban to a draw and where the bulk of the action this summer will take place.
The scale of the Canadians’ and Americans’ pure military advantage is breathtaking. In southern Panjwayi our convoy veered off-road and travelled through a patch of desert to meet 11 Canadian Leopard tanks encamped in a circle. Nothing the insurgents have can put more than a dent in any of those awesome machines. But not even hardware this impressive will provide the “enduring results” and the “persistent, partnered presence” that are on Menard’s checklist of proper counter-insurgency concepts.

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  • ssdd

    This is an excellent article but does not paint the real picture of what our soldiers are going through in Afghanistan. Check out chucksbunk.blogspot.com & read Chuckies Bunker for an account from someone who has been there for 6 months.

  • http://intensedebate.com/people/SunshineCoaster SunshineCoaster

    It appears from this article that the important changes in tactics described by Paul Wells that promise a real chance at success in Afhanistan, have been implemented AFTER General Rick Hillier left the Canadian Armed Forces. His idea that "he would prefer to just kill scumbags" was perhaps not a very professional one. I suspect Hillier was not capable of serious thought about how to engage the Aghan population. Hillier's testimony at the hearings on Aghan detainees would also suggest that his policy of hear no evil, see no evil regarding treatment of Afghan detainees likely alienated the Afghan population resulting in increased casualties for Canadian Forces personnel.

  • M Shannon

    The author did a good job giving the army's explanation of what and how they hope to achieve. The problem is military perception of the situation is wrong. ISAF never "clears" area of the Taliban. The insurgents fight a bit and then if the pressure gets too high down tools and go back to farming or walk away to fight another day. Menard's notion that he'd be happy if they go someplace else is exactly the definition of "whack-a-mole". The vast majority of Afghans don't want any more big ISAF offensives- which are guaranteed to kill more innocent Afghans and destroy a lot of property.

    The spring's big pushes in Helmand haven't worked- the Taliban are still there and now four ISAF battalions are tied down in areas much smaller and less heavily populated than any of the main districts in Kandahar.

    The summer offensive in Kandahar will be hugely expensive and cause relatively heavy innocent Afghan and ISAF casualties. It's effect will be temporary as there is no Afghan government to take over and ISAF will eventually withdraw leaving the field to the Taliban.

    The chances are very high we'll be discussing the latest ISAF plans to pacify Kandahar at this time next year.

    • ssdd

      Just curious, where do you get your information on what the vast majority of Afghans want.

      • M Shannon

        There was a poll published this week that indicated the vast majority of Kandharis were against the upcoming offensive and for negotiations. A second poll showed over half thought well of the Taliban. Whatever NATO has been doing to win over the locals it hasn't worked and they are seen as a foreign occupation force by large numbers of the population. The police are almost universally disrespected and I suspect the higher opinion in which the ANA is held by most Afghans is a result of lack of exposure and better behavior due to ISAF mentoring.

  • Richard Nelson

    Paul, a couple of questions for your considerations …

    1. I seem to remember that General Milner's predecessor as temporary Commander JTF Afghanistan had written that one of the Armed Forces' main uses in this post-Soviet era was cementing our commitments to our allies. With that purpose, how important is it to our forces' being there that the Afghan campaign (or whatever it is) be going well or ill? That is, as long as NATO is committed, should we (Canada) stay committed?

    2. Is one of the problems here that we expect our generals to defend public policy to the media & the public? Even under governments not as committed to message control it would be unusual to have Public Service officers around the Director or DG level to be speaking on the record in defence of broad government initiatives; but we expect 1- to 3-leaf generals to do that, and doesn't that (inevitably?) lead to their sounding like brainless cheerleaders?

  • orval

    Superb journalism. Excellent reporting. It is refreshing to know it still exists. Thank you.

    I hope you follow up with a visit to Brussels. I am anxious to know your views on our standing with our NATO Allies. As you know, we are in Afghanistan not because we want to help the Afghans (we do) but because we are a good and dependable Ally.

    You are right to point out that American combat troops under the command of a Canadian general is a big deal.

  • Sooraj

    Hardy and valiant Canadian Forces troops were more than able to beat back periodic Taliban offensives against Kandahar City. But they were desperately insufficient in number for the task of holding the vast territory beyond. The Canadians put a brave face on, but at best, for year after brutal year, they were buying time. Until what? It was never clear.
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  • http://mediaculpapost.blogspot.com/2010/04/and-even-more-mark-steyn-self.html Guest

    Nice work on an important subject, Mr. Wells, although at some point it would be nice to see some discussion about what it really means to for a society like ours to be at war with the 14th century (have to look elsewhere, perhaps). It’s also a bit sad that the number of comments for a good piece of journalism seem to be in inverse proportion to its quality. An article by one of your colleagues has over 500 comments – as well as an Editor’s note apologizing for significant erroneous quotes – typical errors, in that particular case. Clearly not everyone at Maclean’s works as hard.

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