Barack Obama’s rhetoric on the campaign trail and during his first days in office revolved around the promise of change, notably when it came to how America would relate to the Muslim nations of the Middle East. “We seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect,” he said in his inauguration speech.
“To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict, or blame their society’s ills on the West, know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy. To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.”
It was an explicit and calculated departure from the doctrine of his predecessor, George W. Bush, who believed that American security was enhanced by the spread of democracy, and who spoke of solidarity with the people of oppressive states such as Syria and Iran rather than seeking an understanding with their leaders. “The demands of justice and the peace of this world require their freedom as well,” Bush said in his 2006 state of the union address—this after he had already launched wars to overthrow hostile regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Obama promised a different approach, a “new beginning,” he said to an audience at Cairo University shortly after his inauguration. In the same speech, Obama blamed tensions between the United States and the Muslim world, in part, on “colonialism that denied rights and opportunities to many Muslims,” and he underlined his government’s commitment to engaging with Iran “on the basis of mutual respect.”
The rhetorical gap separating Obama from Bush then was yawning. It has now been more than a year since he spoke those words, and 16 months since his presidency began. How much has American policy in the Middle East really changed in that time, and to the extent that it has, what does the United States have to show for it?
Obama inherited two major wars upon taking office: in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite his vocal opposition to the war in Iraq, he has deviated little from the strategy established there by Bush during his final two years in office. A troop surge and counter-insurgency campaign ordered by Bush—and strongly opposed by Obama—in 2007 helped curtail violence in the country. When the surge appeared to be working in 2008, Obama scaled back his opposition and has since held to the scheduled troop withdrawals agreed to by Bush and the Iraqi government.
Obama has been much more aggressive in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which he believes are crucial to American security in a way that Iraq is not. He has poured thousands of additional American troops into Afghanistan, where they employ the same “clear, hold, and build” counter-insurgency tactics used by U.S. forces during the surge in Iraq. This strategic continuity is not surprising. Obama’s secretary of defence, Robert Gates, was nominated by Bush in 2006.
Obama, unlike his predecessor, doesn’t talk about a “war on terror.” But the targets—al-Qaeda and its affiliates—haven’t changed. If anything, Obama is more hawkish in pursuing them. The frequency of air strikes by Predator and Reaper unmanned drones in Pakistan have soared during the Obama presidency, and U.S. special forces are now operating in 75 countries.
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