Photograph by Logan Mock-Bunting/Getty Images
Tony Blair ranks high on the list of Britain’s most successful prime ministers, having led his Labour Party to three consecutive majorities. But by the time he left office in 2007, after a decade in power and two major wars, he was also among the country’s most divisive. His new memoir, A Journey, published this week by Knopf Canada, charts the ups and downs of a political life.
Q: A few weeks ago you announced your intention to donate the profits from this memoir, and I gather the advance money as well, to the British Legion to help wounded veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan. Why?
A: I wanted to honour the commitment and show my respect to people who I think have done the most amazing job. Those from my country, the U.K., the U.S. and Canadian armed forces, all of those who have been in the front line of this battle. I wanted to donate to the Royal British Legion in order to try to help, and in particular prepare, those who have been injured to either go back to front-line service or civilian life. It’s a worthy cause, but I had actually decided to give the money to a charity connected to the armed forces before I had even written the book.
Q: It’s a decision that has been lauded by some, and dismissed as a calculating PR move by others. But in the book, you do refer to the emotional toll the deaths and casualties took on you. How has that burden changed you?
A: You wouldn’t be human if you didn’t feel both a sense of responsibility and a deep sadness for those who have lost their lives. That responsibility stays with me now, and will stay with me for the rest of my life. You know, I came to office as prime minister in 1997, focusing on domestic policy and ended up in four conflicts—Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. And it does change you, and so it should.
Q: The decision that you made to join the war in Iraq is a central part of the book. You still believe you made the right choice. Why?
A: Because I believed then, and still believe, that Saddam was a threat, that the threat had to be dealt with. What I tried to explain in the book is how Sept. 11 changed the calculus of risk for me. The single most important thing is to understand that 3,000 people died in one day in the streets of New York, but had they been able to make it 300,000, they would have. That then changed my whole attitude to the issue of WMD. We know now that Saddam didn’t have an active WMD program at the time we invaded. But we also know from the Iraq Survey Group and other reports that this was because he had put the program into abeyance, not that he had abandoned it. And so the danger was always going to be that he would re-emerge stronger and reconstitute his program. So even on the basis of what we know now, I still think the world is better off and safer without him.
Q: In the book you also say you misunderstood the depth of the challenge the 9/11 attacks posed. Why?
A: I think what happened with 9/11 is that people sort of felt that it came from nowhere. Whereas I think now we understand the roots are very deep. I say it’s like revolutionary Communism, something that is going to have to be knocked out over a very long period of time. This strain of extremism continues to be very strong, whether it’s in Afghanistan, or Somalia or Yemen, or any of these places. After Sept. 11, I don’t think it was so clear that we have to be prepared for the long haul.
Q: That’s another point you raise, how in your opinion militant Islam counts on the West’s desire for short and successful conflicts. Do you have a sense that they understood us better than we understood them?
A: I think what they have understood is that we find it difficult to sustain the commitment and the will. In my experience, our front-line soldiers don’t have that problem, but our public is often tired and somewhat depressed by the length of time it takes. On the other hand, you only have to see what the Taliban did recently—stoning to death a couple who were in love with each other—to realize how wicked this stream of extremism is and how necessary it is to combat it. What I say in the book is that you need a mix of hard and soft power—that’s one of the reasons the Mideast peace process is so important. But you have to understand that these people want to wait us out and we have to be prepared to show them we are committed.
Q: How do we demonstrate that in Afghanistan? There’s a great debate about what the West’s future engagement should be.
A: Obviously it is right that the Afghans take responsibility for their own future in the end, but they need to know and feel that we are there as partners for them if they are prepared to make the necessary changes. But we should be in no doubt as to why we are in Afghanistan. We ended up there because terrorism hatched there erupted thousands of miles away in New York on Sept. 11.
Q: You pledged to stand “shoulder to shoulder” with the U.S. after 9/11, and you certainly walked the talk. But were you a bit naive about the political fallout of that decision as well?
A: No. For me, 9/11 was a game changer. It altered my perception of the security threat we faced. I took the position that Britain should be shoulder to shoulder with the U.S. It was a big decision; I didn’t take it lightly, or in ignorance of its consequences. It’s a big commitment for a country to give, but I believed it was the right thing to do.
Q: You’ve written that some of your opponents’ taunts did get to you, being labelled “Bliar” in particular. But how did you feel about the characterizations of your relationship with George W. Bush—the suggestion that you were somehow in this thrall, like his lapdog, or poodle?
A: [Snorts] I’m afraid that’s in the nature of modern politics—it’s as much conducted by abuse as argument. And you’ve just got to shrug that off. The fact of the matter is that there were many issues upon which I profoundly disagreed with George W. Bush. But on this issue—the existential security threat that we had to confront—I agreed with him.
Q: You say that Bush was underestimated. What do his critics fail to grasp?
A: They often distrust the simplicity of his world view. Where sometimes such simplicity does illuminate the choice for us. I find this in the Middle East. There is, in fact, a pretty stark choice: does the region embrace the 21st century or does it go for a kind of religious regression? One of the things that I say in the book is that I’m not asking you to agree with me, but at least open your mind. And there is another point of view about him, frankly.
Q: Do you still talk to him?
A: Sure, from time to time.
Q: He’s got a book coming out as well. Did you consult on your memoirs?
A: Not specifically, but we know each others’ thinking pretty well.
Q: In your 10 years in office, you faced a wide variety of challenges. One of the first was the death of Princess Diana. You pushed the royal family to show a more human reaction. Do you think the fate of the monarchy really did hang in the balance at that point?
A: It felt like it at the time, but whether that’s true or not, I’m not sure. There’s a deep affection and respect for the Queen and the monarchy in the U.K. But Diana was an extraordinary, iconic figure and her death sparked a fierce reaction, part grief and part anger at her being taken away. It was very fraught.
