‘Nothing changes’

By Aaron Wherry - Thursday, June 23, 2011 at 1:20 PM - 0 Comments

Graeme Smith talks to the director of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission.

Are the security forces still beating people and electrocuting people?

Generally, in the various forces, it’s still a bad situation with the prisoners. One change is that before they were abusing people in front of us, and now they are doing it in hidden places.

The past few days in things that are somewhat more consequential

By Aaron Wherry - Monday, April 19, 2010 at 12:35 PM - 30 Comments

Gen. Walter Natynczyk has written to the special committee on Afghanistan to outline the military’s account of one of the events referenced last week by Malgarai Ahmadshah.

Meanwhile, the Hill Times reports that the Speaker is set to rule this week on the question of privilege raised by opposition members in regards to the House demand that the government produce all documents related to Afghan detainees.

And the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission reports that Canada turned over 163 prisoners last year—a figure the Canadian government has not released on the grounds of operational security.

'Commonplace among the the majority of law enforcement institutions'

By Aaron Wherry - Friday, March 12, 2010 at 10:55 AM - 26 Comments

As the Star notes, the U.S. State Department has released its annual human rights reports for the countries of the world, including Afghanistan.

Human rights organizations reported local authorities tortured and abused detainees. Torture and abuse methods included, but were not limited to, beating by stick, scorching bar, or iron bar; flogging by cable; battering by rod; electric shock; deprivation of sleep, water, and food; abusive language; sexual humiliation; and rape. An April Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) report stated that torture was commonplace among the majority of law enforcement institutions, especially the police, and that officials used torture when a victim refused to confess to elicit bribes or because of personal enmity. Observers report that some police failed to understand the laws regarding torture.

Past due

By Aaron Wherry - Tuesday, January 26, 2010 at 1:40 PM - 13 Comments

While Richard Colvin awaits the necessary funds to pay his legal bills, the Liberals have publicly tabled some of the dozens of written questions they had put on the order paper and were awaiting government response when the second session of the 40th Parliament met its untimely demise. Included among them, several on the matter of Afghan detainees. To wit.

Who was responsible for redacting the documents and what role did the DFAIT, National Defence, the Privy Council Office or any ministry play? How many times has the government notified the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) of allegations of abuse, mistreatment, or torture of Canadian-transferred detainees?  Did the government follow-up on these or any other investigation with regards to allegations or evidence of abuse, mistreatment, or torture of Canadian-transferred detainees to ensure that each of the allegations had been investigated?  What were the results of these investigations?  What did the government do to assure itself that the allegations had been sufficiently investigated by the AIHRC or any other entity?  Were any records or files kept on these investigations?   Were any of these investigations deemed to be insufficient and, if so, what was done to remedy this? Did the government ever request legal opinions regarding Canada’s domestic and international legal responsibility for detainees captured by the Canadian military or military police in Afghanistan and transferred to Afghan authorities?  Did this legal advice contribute to the formulation of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada’s diplomatic contingency plan related to detainees?

'Strategic (Macro) Level Engagement'

By Aaron Wherry - Monday, December 7, 2009 at 11:32 PM - 9 Comments

Canadian Press gains access to internal documents and finds talking points, expressed concerns and wrangling over contingencies.

As the winter of 2006-07 settled in, Canadian officials began to hear abuse concerns from more than just the Red Cross. British and Dutch forces, who followed the Canadians into southern Afghanistan, were “deeply frustrated” even though their agreements with Kabul allowed them more access to prisoners.

“UK/Dutch pol/mil colleagues lament that they are unable to track their detainees,” said a Dec. 4, 2006, memo viewed by The Canadian Press. ”It is unclear whether they are tortured, held beyond legal limits, or (all too frequently) released back to battlefield.”

The Allies were worried “the detainee issue could explode at any moment into a political firestorm.”

The Colvin encyclopedia

By Aaron Wherry - Sunday, December 6, 2009 at 1:31 PM - 25 Comments

A collection of documents, testimony and news reports related to Richard Colvin and Canada’s handling of Afghan detainees. The Colvin encyclopedia is updated as events warrant.

Continue…

What should have been known and when?

By Aaron Wherry - Thursday, November 26, 2009 at 9:30 AM - 20 Comments

Gen. Michel Gauthier made reference Wednesday afternoon to the Globe and Mail’s reporting in April 2007 as to when he first became aware of allegations of torture. Without the transcript of his comments it’s unclear—from my memory and what’s being reported elsewhere—how precisely he qualified that statement, whether he was referring to specific allegations of general torture, specific allegations related to detainees transferred by Canadian Forces, or something else entirely.

In terms of third-party sourcing—and in lieu, so far, of Mr. Colvin’s full reporting—there are at least three general reports that precede the Globe’s investigation. On March 3, 2006 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour, a Canadian, reported that complaints of “arbitrary arrest, illegal detention and torture” were common in the Afghan justice system. The U.S. State Department’s 2005 report on Afghanistan appears to have been published on March 8, 2006. It states that “credible observers reported that local authorities in Herat, Helmand, and other locations routinely tortured and abused detainees.” And on June 2, 2006, a Canadian Press story was sent out on the wires that cited a spokesman for the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission who estimated that human rights violations were experienced by approximately 30 percent of transferred prisoners.

The Commons: Prove it

By Aaron Wherry - Monday, November 23, 2009 at 6:23 PM - 38 Comments

The Scene. With the Prime Minister back on Canadian soil and allowed a few days to recover from the profound jet lag that comes with circumnavigating the globe, it seemed that today would be the day his presence would once more be registered in the House of Commons. Ah, but wouldn’t you know it, our national men’s lacrosse team was in Ottawa this afternoon and, obviously, it seemed only courteous that they be granted a brief audience with the PM at precisely 2:15pm.

Good luck for him as he apparently managed to win a very handsome jersey in the process. But poor luck for the House. And, indeed, for the Prime Minister’s Defence Minister, a man whose knees must be nearly worn completely out from all the sitting and standing.

The first of what would be 20 questions for Peter MacKay this day was tabled by Michael Ignatieff, the Liberal leader returning to the House after a few days away himself. Why, Mr. Ignatieff wondered en français, had the Canadian Forces, as disclosed by the chief of the defence staff over the weekend, decided on several occasions to halt the transfer of detainees to Afghan authorities?

Across the way, John Baird chirped about “coercive interrogation.”

Mr. MacKay attempted to explain. “Mr. Speaker, I thank the Leader of the Opposition for the question,” he said. “As he would know, and as he has indicated, decisions to stop transfers are operational decisions taken on a case-by-case basis in a theatre of operations by military personnel. In this instance, and it is now on the government web site, there were three operational decisions taken that resulted in pauses of transfers. Most recently, I want to indicate, the reason that the transfers stopped was because the Afghan officials were not living up to their expectations, not living up to the expectations set out in the transfer arrangements. The decision to stop was based on the fact that they were not living up to those expectations.”

Mr. Ignatieff returned with an assertion. “Mr. Speaker,” he said, “in other words it is reasonable to assume that detainees were being abused.”

“Nooo!” moaned various Conservatives. Continue…

What happened to those 130?

By Aaron Wherry - Monday, November 23, 2009 at 11:50 AM - 0 Comments

The government has long maintained that to disclose the number of detainees transferred by Canadian Forces in Afghanistan would violate operational security, but a government source now tells the Globe that approximately 130 were transferred during the first 14 months of combat operations in Kandahar.

In June 2006, when news broke that Canadian soldiers had twice intervened to prevent the execution of prisoners, a spokesman for the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission told the Canadian Press that about 30 percent of prisoners handed over to Afghan authorities were abused. CP’s report of June 2, in its entirety, after the jump. Continue…

The standard of proof

By Aaron Wherry - Friday, November 20, 2009 at 2:10 PM - 12 Comments

In QP this morning, John Baird explained, in part, the government’s unwillingness to put its faith in Mr. Colvin’s testimony as follows.

Mr. Speaker, it is important to note that in his testimony before the committee earlier this week Mr. Colvin confirmed that he never witnessed abuse firsthand.

It is unclear whether this consideration equally imperils some or all of this 2005 report of the U.S. State Department, this 2008 report of the State Department, the 2007 reporting of the Globe’s Graeme Smith, this government’s own 2006 overview of the human rights situation in Afghanistan, or this 2009 report of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission.

It’s also unclear whether the government believed Mr. Colvin to have firsthand knowledge of abuse when, as the Defence Minister explained yesterday, the government revised its detainee transfer agreement because of “concerns that were being expressed by Colvin and others.”

Keeping in mind that it is equally unclear to what degree Mr. Colvin’s concerns were taken into account given that Gordon O’Connor, the defence minister at the time, said yesterday that he did not read any of Mr. Colvin’s reports.

The Commons: Eighteen attempts to explain the same story

By Aaron Wherry - Thursday, November 19, 2009 at 8:21 PM - 43 Comments

The Scene. Fewer Conservatives than usual chose to mockingly applaud Bob Rae when he rose to open Question Period this afternoon. Odd that.

“Mr. Speaker, the testimony yesterday of Richard Colvin before the Afghanistan committee showed two clear things,” Mr. Rae began, to groans from the Conservative side at mention of Mr. Colvin’s name.

“First, Mr. Colvin testified that he had information with respect to the mistreatment of prisoners in Afghan prisons and that he gave that information to his superiors. Second, Mr. Colvin testified that he was also told by his superiors to shut up, essentially,” Mr. Rae continued. “Given the importance of these two revelations, the revelations of mistreatment, harsh treatment and even torture and the revelation with respect to a cover-up, would the minister not agree with me and with others that there should indeed be a full public inquiry into what has taken place with respect to the transfer of these detainees?”

Across the aisle, Peter MacKay furrowed his brow, thrust his left hand in his pocket and commenced with the first of his 18 attempts to explain.

“Mr. Speaker, it has been stated here a number of times that there has not been a single, solitary proven allegation of abuse involving a transferred Taliban prisoner by Canadian Forces. Second, with respect to the evidence yesterday, what we know is that when the evidence is put to the test, it simply does not stand up,” he offered. “Mr. Colvin had an opportunity to speak directly to me and other ministers of the government who were in Afghanistan. He did not raise the issue. As well, what is being relied upon here is nothing short of hearsay, second- or third-hand information, or that which came directly from the Taliban.”

That Mr. Colvin’s credibility would be an issue for Mr. MacKay is perhaps confusing, seeing as how Mr. Colvin remains sufficiently fit, at least in this government’s judgment, to serve as the deputy head of intelligence at this country’s embassy in Washington, DC. Mr. Rae took note of this. Continue…

98.5%

By Aaron Wherry - Thursday, November 19, 2009 at 12:47 PM - 37 Comments

Yesterday Richard Colvin reported that, “according to our information, the likelihood is that all the Afghans we handed over were tortured.”

Here is an April report from the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, a commission Canada funds and is partnered with in the monitoring of detainees. On page 31, it concludes in part:

Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment are common in the majority of law enforcement institutions and at least 98.5% of interviewed victims have been tortured. Institutions where torture has occurred include police (security, justice, traffic), prosecution office, national security, detention center, custody, prison, and national army.

*Note: The report’s use of the term “victim” above is slightly confusing in that context. Here’s how the AIHRC puts it at page 12 of the same report: “The findings of this research reveal that torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment are a commonplace practice in the majority of law enforcement institutions and that at least 98.5% of interviewees believed they had been tortured by these institutions.” It’s possible there is an issue of translation here. Readers are encouraged to review the entire report.