Laurie Hawn is unimpressed

By Aaron Wherry - Wednesday, April 11, 2012 at 8:30 AM - 0 Comments

Various ministers maintained last week that the Harper government accepted the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Auditor General, but Bob Rae pointed out that this didn’t quite match the formal response offered by two of the government’s departments. Peter Van Loan clarified that “the position of the government is not the position taken by the officials in those departments” and that cabinet “agrees with the Auditor General.”

Now emerge the views of Laurie Hawn, Conservative MP and former parliamentary secretary to the minister of national defence (and a retired air force colonel).

That’s not how Mr. Hawn sees things — and in his letter to a concerned citizen he made clear he believes there is nothing to apologize for. “There has never been any wrongdoing or bad faith on the part of National Defence or other people involved with the program,” he said. 

He accused Michael Ferguson, the Auditor-General, of getting some figures are “just factually wrong.” “He says that, in 2008, National Defence estimated acquisition at $9-billion and sustainment [operating costs] at $16-billion. That is not correct — it was $9-billion plus $7-billion for a total of $16-billion, again over 20 years. If he can’t get some basic facts right, it makes you wonder about other things.”

New and old math

By Aaron Wherry - Tuesday, April 10, 2012 at 6:42 PM - 0 Comments

The Defence Minister explains the difference between $25 billion and $15 billion.

“The $10-billion that he has described as not being disclosed was what you pay our current pilots, the gas that you put in the current fleet of CF-18s … if you went out and bought a new mini-van and it was going to cost you $20,000 you wouldn’t calculate the gas, the washer fluid, the oil and give yourself a salary to drive it for the next 15 to 20 years.”

“Now that’s part of the new calculation now,” he said.

The “new calculation” reflects an estimate that the Department of National Defence calculated two years ago. And a calculation that seems to match Treasury Board guidelines. But, again, the Auditor General’s concerns about costing for the F-35 extend beyond that to the “life-cycle costing.”

We have a number of observations regarding the life-cycle costing for the F-35. First, costs have not been fully presented in relation to the life of the aircraft. The estimated life expectancy of the F-35 is about 8,000 flying hours, or about 36 years based on predicted usage. National Defence plans to operate the fleet for at least that long. It is able to estimate costs over 36 years. We recognize that long-term estimates are highly sensitive to assumptions about future costs as well as to currency exchange rates. However, in presenting costs to government decision makers and to Parliament, National Defence estimated life-cycle costs over 20 years. This practice understates operating, personnel, and sustainment costs, as well as some capital costs, because the time period is shorter than the aircraft’s estimated life expectancy. The JSF Program Office provided National Defence with projected sustainment costs over 36 years.

This, again, is what Alan Williams considers the “known distortion.”

The measure of the F-35

By Aaron Wherry - Tuesday, April 10, 2012 at 8:30 AM - 0 Comments

Alan Williams, the former assistant deputy minister with National Defence, points with concern to the department’s use of a 20-year timeline for the F-35.

“That’s a known distortion,” Williams said. “If you have as your intent to be as open as possible, you don’t do that.”

There is no question that government and military intends the F-35 or whichever other aircraft replaces Canada’s aging fleet of CF-18s to remain the country’s main aerial fighter until the middle of the century. ”It has to go for at least 30 years, which is our typical expectation,” Royal Canadian Air Force commander Lt.-Gen. Andre Deschamps told a parliamentary committee on Sept. 15, 2010.

Williams says it’s not unusual to exclude expenses like personnel and fuel from projections, but Andrew Coyne contrasts Peter MacKay’s explanation with the Treasury Board guidelines.

… it is directly contrary to longstanding Treasury Board directives, which stress throughout that the costs of any acquisition must include “all relevant costs over the useful life of the acquisition, not solely the initial or basic contractual cost” (Contracting Policy, 2006). Among the costs deemed “relevant” are those related to “planning, acquisition, operating and disposal,” including forecast “modifications, conversions, repairs, and replacement.”

Specifically, an “acquisition decision that is based on the lowest purchase price but that ignores potential operations and maintenance (O&M) costs may result in higher overall costs,” it notes in Guide to Management of Materiel. Among the suggested considerations, in assessing operations costs: “Are all training costs included? Are the costs of fuel and lubricants included? Are all repair costs included?”

The Globe tests Mr. MacKay’s explanations against what the experts say. An American analyst tells the Canadian Press it’s time to ask questions about the F-35′s capabilities.

About that documentation

By Aaron Wherry - Monday, April 9, 2012 at 10:47 AM - 0 Comments

One last point on the Defence Minister’s comments this weekend. Nearer the end of the interview, Kevin Newman asked Mr. MacKay about the “supporting documents” for the military’s analysis. Mr. MacKay reassured Mr. Newman.

There are certainly supporting documents. We’ll have Public Accounts look at that now. They’ll be officials before Public Accounts to talk about the supporting documents. There are documents that go back a number of years, as I said this is a 15-year procurement that began in 1997 under the previous Liberal government. And so there will an opportunity to look at all those documents. The key here, in my view, is to continue forward in a way that is going to ensure that we don’t face operational gaps. That the CF-18′s will be replaced with an aircraft that will meet the needs of our country and, most particularly, of the airforce.

In his report, the Auditor General makes several references to documentation (emphasis mine). Continue…

About that timeline

By Aaron Wherry - Monday, April 9, 2012 at 9:30 AM - 0 Comments

In his interview with CTV, Peter MacKay also noted the “discrepancy” between the 36-year timeline of the Parliamentary Budget Officer and* the Auditor General and the 20-year plan put forward by the Department of National Defence. In his report, the Auditor General stressed that a 36-year timeline was more accurate.

We have a number of observations regarding the life-cycle costing for the F-35. First, costs have not been fully presented in relation to the life of the aircraft. The estimated life expectancy of the F-35 is about 8,000 flying hours, or about 36 years based on predicted usage. National Defence plans to operate the fleet for at least that long. It is able to estimate costs over 36 years. We recognize that long-term estimates are highly sensitive to assumptions about future costs as well as to currency exchange rates. However, in presenting costs to government decision makers and to Parliament, National Defence estimated life-cycle costs over 20 years. This practice understates operating, personnel, and sustainment costs, as well as some capital costs, because the time period is shorter than the aircraft’s estimated life expectancy. The JSF Program Office provided National Defence with projected sustainment costs over 36 years.

*An astute reader points out that the Parliamentary Budget Officer used a 30-year timeline.

Better know $25 billion

By Aaron Wherry - Monday, April 9, 2012 at 8:31 AM - 0 Comments

In an interview with CTV’s Question Period, Peter MacKay explains the $25-billion estimate that National Defence prepared for the F-35 in June 2010.

“Well I’m glad you’ve raised this issue, in fact I think it was Craig Oliver that first put this on the air in recent days; the 10 billion dollar gap or difference in estimation is accounted for by the way in which we pay pilots, we maintain the aircraft, that is to say that that 10 million dollar difference is money that we are paying right now. So there’s a different interpretation in the all up costs at arriving at 25 billion. We have included that figure in estimates and information provided to the auditor General. And that information goes back to the year 2010. Those figures are there for all to see. But it is a different calculation than an acquisition. We have always said that 9 billion dollars is the cost of the aircraft. There’s an additional 5.7 billion then for maintenance that is weapons, onboard equipment etc. But the 10 billion dollars is money that we’re paying right now Kevin. That is money that goes to pay the pilots of the F18 program, and fuel, oil, upkeep of the existing fleet.”

It is probably worth reviewing again how the cost of the F-35 has been explained over the last two years. Continue…

The Commons: The $25 billion question

By Aaron Wherry - Thursday, April 5, 2012 at 8:02 PM - 0 Comments

The Scene. Joe Comartin stepped out from behind his desk and presented the question of the moment.

“This morning the Auditor General has said the responsibility for the misleading information that came to this House about the cost lies directly in the cabinet of the Conservative government,” the NDP House leader reported. “I would ask the Prime Minister today, will he stand in this House and tell us whether in fact the cabinet knew what the true costs were going to be for the F-35s?”

The Prime Minister might not have been expected to stand here: Mr. Harper generally declining to answer questions put to him by anyone who isn’t the leader of a recognized party. But here he stood to respond. Not to answer the question at hand, but to respond nonetheless.

“Mr. Speaker, once again, the government has not actually purchased any airplanes. The government plans to do that some years hence, and we will set up an independent committee to supervise that process,” he reassured. “What the Auditor General in fact did say is that in terms of his report the government is taking steps in the right direction. Of course he also confirms that no money has been spent on this acquisition.”

Mr. Comartin was unimpressed. “Mr. Speaker, is that not typical?” he lamented. “Again no responsibility, no true information coming to this House.”

The issue here is a matter of billions. Continue…

Cabinet knew?

By Aaron Wherry - Thursday, April 5, 2012 at 12:43 PM - 0 Comments

The Auditor General appeared before the public accounts committee this morning. Afterwards, he was pressed to specify who was aware of the defence department’s estimate that the F-35 would cost $25 billion.

“I can’t speak to individuals who knew it, but it was information that was prepared by National Defence,” Ferguson said Thursday, “and it’s certainly my understanding that that would have been information that, yes, the government would have had.”

 Ferguson was clear that by government, he was referring to the executive, namely cabinet and other members of the Conservative government, not the bureaucracy. ”That $25 billion number was something I think that at that time was known to government,” he said. “It would have been primarily members of the executive, yes.”

‘These two versions of reality cannot both be true’

By Aaron Wherry - Thursday, April 5, 2012 at 12:39 PM - 0 Comments

Interim Liberal leader Bob Rae rose after Question Period with the following point of privilege.

Mr. Speaker on Tuesday of this week April 3, 2012 you had the honour of tabling in this House the 2012 Report of the Auditor General.

The Auditor General of course is an officer of Parliament and the reports tabled through you by his office are presumed to be an accurate reflection of the issues his office undertook to examine. As such all members of this place operate on the assumption that the contents of the Auditor General’s report, tabled by the Speaker are reliable enough to base not only questions and comments upon but for the government and if necessary Parliament to act upon whether through administrative reforms or legislative measures.

That is point number one.

My second point concerns the contents of questions, answers or statements made in this place by members. As the Speaker is well aware there are certain words and terms which are considered unparliamentary and when used by a member, the Speaker has the authority to sanction that member for the use of such terms. One such term is the word “liar”. A member who uses that word when addressing another member is considered to have breached this rules of this House and is expected to apologize. If no apology is forthcoming, the Speaker has the power and authority to sanction that member. All members of this place have accepted this authority.

Continue…

About that “contract”

By Aaron Wherry - Thursday, April 5, 2012 at 8:00 AM - 0 Comments

As noted yesterday, the idea of there being a “contract” to purchase the F-35 seems to have changed. (Here and here are other examples of Mr. Harper using the c-word. And here is Michael Ignatieff using it. And here is Bob Rae using it five months ago.)

When the Prime Minister was confronted about his terminology last month, he explained that he was referring to a “memorandum of understanding.” That MOU was signed in December 2006. The decision to acquire the F-35 was announced in July 2010. And here is a handy fact sheet explaining the MOU.

Canada is buying the F-35 is through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) versus signing a contract…

Signing the MoU in 2006 did not commit JSF partners to buy the F-35, instead it laid out the terms and conditions should a partner country decide to purchase the aircraft.

Peter MacKay did refer to an “MOU” on two occasions in 2010, here and here. Tony Clement managed to describe it as both a memorandum of understanding and a contract. But that a contract had not been signed seems to have become a point of emphasis five weeks ago, when Julian Fantino stood in the House and said so.

But that is not quite the end of it. Understandably, the memorandum of understanding is referenced numerous times in the Auditor General’s report. Here is how Postmedia’s Lee Berthiaume summarized the relevant findings earlier this week.

The report says that in convincing the Conservative government to sign onto the MOU, the military talked up the potential billions in contracts Canadian industry could secure if the country continued to participate in the project. However, “while ministers were told, correctly, that signing the 2006 MOU did not commit Canada to buy the F-35, we did not see evidence they were told that retaining industrial benefits depended on buying the F-35 as a partner in the [Joint Strike Fighter] program.”

… Defence Department officials also did not tell ministers that by signing the memorandum of understanding, the government would be hard-pressed to run a fair competition in the future to replace Canada’s ageing fleet of CF-18s.

And now, quite interestingly, here is John Ivison’s latest column. He turns to an October 2010 meeting of the defence committee and an exchange between Dan Ross, the assistant deputy minister for material at National Defence, and former Liberal MP Bryon Wilfert. Mr. Ross apparently argued that holding an open competition to replace the CF-18s would require withdrawing from the memorandum and that would result in penalties and loss of benefits. But Mr. Wilfert was not convinced. Continue…

The Commons: Accepting responsibilities without taking responsibility

By Aaron Wherry - Wednesday, April 4, 2012 at 5:48 PM - 0 Comments

The Scene. ”Who was responsible for the F-35?” Thomas Mulcair asked at the outset.

This was both straightforward and profound. A direct question, but a philosophical riddle. If a massive abuse of procedure and accountability falls in the forest, but no one is named, blamed and shamed as the culprit, did it ever really happen? One is reminded of the moment last November when Tony Clement could not say precisely who had broken the rules in the G8 Legacy Fund affair.

“Mr. Speaker, the Auditor General is very clear regarding the responsibilities in this respect,” the Prime Minister offered by way of response.

Mr. Mulcair seemed to feel a lesson was in order. Our parliamentary system, he said, is based on the principle of ministerial responsibility. The minister is responsible for his ministry. The Prime Minister is responsible for picking his ministers.  ”Does the Prime Minister think,” Mr. Mulcair wondered, “that the Defence Minister has done his job?”

“Yes,” Mr. Harper offered. “The government and ministers accept their responsibilities.” Continue…

The amazing, disappearing contract that never was

By Aaron Wherry - Wednesday, April 4, 2012 at 5:35 PM - 0 Comments

Stephen Harper, November 3, 2010.  We are going to need to replace the aircraft at the end of this decade, and the party opposite knows that. But instead, for the sake of getting the anti-military vote on the left, with the NDP and the Bloc, the Liberals are playing this game. The mistake is theirs. It would be a mistake to rip up this contract for our men and women in uniform as well as the aerospace industry.

Peter MacKay, December 13, 2010. Mr. Speaker, let us look at the actual contract. What the Canadian government has committed to is a $9 billion contract for the acquisition of 65 fifth generation aircraft.

Stephen Harper, January 14, 2011. “I do find it disappointing, I find it sad, that some in Parliament are backtracking on the F-35 and some are talking openly about cancelling the contract, should they get the chance,” Harper said at the Heroux-Devtek plant in Dorval.

Stephen Harper, today. The government has not signed a contract.

Stephen Harper, today. As I have said repeatedly, we will ensure that when we replace the aircraft at the end of this decade, and we have not yet signed a contract in that regard.

Peter MacKay, today. Mr. Speaker, as was mentioned, with no contract in place, no money misspent, and now funds frozen, we are injecting more accountability into this process.

Julian Fantino, today. We have not signed a contract to purchase a replacement aircraft.

‘The buck stops at the top’

By Aaron Wherry - Wednesday, April 4, 2012 at 1:01 PM - 0 Comments

Bob Rae continues to target the Prime Minister.

“You can’t get away with the fiction that a $10-billion mistake in calculating the cost of the F-35 stealth fighter … had nothing to do with the man in charge, with the man whose name and whose moniker is on every single publication of this government,” Rae told a special Liberal caucus meeting Wednesday. ”He cannot now pretend that he was just the piano player in the brothel who didn’t have a clue as to what was really going on upstairs.”

While he expects a public servant or maybe even a cabinet minister or two might get “thrown under a bus,” Rae said: “A massive fraud of this kind can’t be ascribed to anyone other than the prime minister of Canada. This is Stephen Harper’s baby. … That’s why we say and I say without hesitation, Stephen Harper is not fit to be the prime minister of Canada.” Rae added: “I’ll tell you who I think should resign. Stephen Harper should resign. The buck stops at the top.”

The piano player at a brothel metaphor is one a young Bob Rae once used to taunt Allan MacEachen. (Mr. Rae and Mr. MacEachen are now close friends.)

Accountability and the F-35

By Aaron Wherry - Wednesday, April 4, 2012 at 9:33 AM - 0 Comments

Alan Williams, the former assistant deputy minister who has been raising concerns about the F-35 for months, talks to the CBC about where responsibility lies. Philippe Lagasse reviews the Auditor General’s report and the lessons that should be learned.

Once they had announced that the F-35 was Canada’s next fighter, moreover, Conservative ministers refused to question DND’s unsubstantiated estimates and figures until the aircraft’s widely reported cost overruns and technical difficulties could no longer be ignored.  Hence, although the Auditor General focuses on the errors and oversights of DND and PWGCS, it is evident that Conservative ministers failed in their responsibilities, too.

More to the point, no ministers should be permitted to avoid their constitutional responsibility for the affairs of the departments, no matter how much ignorance or inexperience they claim. Allowing ministers to shift their responsibility onto their departments or officials, however poorly they performed, would undermine the very bedrock of our system of responsible government.

John Geddes reviews the recent history of military procurement.

Who is to blame? Who will take responsibility?

By Aaron Wherry - Wednesday, April 4, 2012 at 8:30 AM - 0 Comments

NDP MP Matthew Kellway considers.

I don’t think responsibility in our political system should fall on the bureaucrats. The responsibility falls on the Minister. And so that’s where it rests. I think the Auditor General gave us a report that leads us right to the doorstep of the Associate Minister, two Ministers—one in Public Works and one of Defence —and the Prime Minister himself. And that’s where the responsibility lies.

Liberal MP Marc Garneau ponders.

The government of course is going to try to put all the blame on them and some of that blame does exist within DND. Certainly one can question whether the  Chief of Defence Staff should continue in his post because he is the top soldier. But let’s be very careful and not let the government suck us in and say, well, we were in the dark, it’s not really our fault. This is a pattern with this government. When they get themselves into trouble, they tend to attack the civil servants. They do not take their responsibilities … I used to be in DND. I spent my career in there and I did a lot of procurement. To suggest that the Minister of National Defence, the Minister of Public Works were not in the loop on the biggest defence spending program ever is absolutely ludicrous. They knew what was going on. What happened is that Mr. MacKay bought in hook, line and sinker into what the generals wanted over there which was the F-35 and he said, yes, I’m going to go to bat for you and he did not take his responsibility as a minister for what is an expenditure of tens of millions of dollars.

Bob Rae suggested the Prime Minister might resign. The Ottawa Citizen editorial board points at Peter MacKay. The Toronto Star says heads should roll.

Ready and willing

By Aaron Wherry - Tuesday, April 3, 2012 at 7:39 PM - 0 Comments

A statement from the Parliamentary Budget Officer.

In March 2011, the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) provided Parliament with a report on the estimated acquisition and sustainment costs associated with Canada’s planned purchase of 65 F-35 fighter jets. Shortly thereafter, the Department of National Defence (DND) responded to the PBO report. In that response, DND claimed that the total costs associated with the F-35 program would be approximately $15 billion. However, the recent Auditor General’s report reveals that, in June 2010, DND’s true cost estimate was approximately $25 billion—representing a difference of $10 billion. The inclusion of this difference would bring DND’s cost estimate in line with that of the PBO.

The PBO remains ready and willing to serve Parliament by providing independent analysis on any new options the Government may wish to consider replacing Canada’s aging fleet of CF-18s.

The Commons: Stephen Harper’s Royal Canadian Air Farce

By Aaron Wherry - Tuesday, April 3, 2012 at 5:44 PM - 0 Comments

The Scene. “They knew it.”

What did they know? They knew the cost of purchasing the F-35 would be higher than they had let on. This much, Thomas Mulcair explained, had now been proven by the Auditor General.

“Why,” the leader of the opposition thus asked, “did the Conservatives deliberately gave false information to Parliament and Canadians?”

The Prime Minister stood here, shrugged and dismissed it all. “Mr. Speaker, I do not accept these conclusions of the opposition leader,” Mr. Harper said, without elaborating. The Auditor General had, Mr. Harper explained, made “certain findings” and “identified the need for greater supervision.” The government accepted this much.

Switching to English, Mr. Mulcair was sharp and stinging in response. Continue…

National Defence, the Parliamentary Budget Officer and the Auditor General

By Aaron Wherry - Tuesday, April 3, 2012 at 3:43 PM - 0 Comments

March 2011. “The Department of National Defence stands behind the estimates that we have communicated publicly,” said Dan Ross, assistant deputy minister for materiel. He said those costs are based on millions of pages of detailed figures — some of them commercially sensitive — that have been calculated over a decade. He refused to explain those numbers to reporters, just as he had refused to do so when the report’s authors made such a request.

Today. The Canada First Defence Strategy established a budget of CAN$9 billion to acquire 65 next generation fighter aircraft. This budget figure was subsequently included in National Defence’s 2009 Investment Plan. It was also carried forward into decision documents to support the July 2010 announcement. Also in 2008, a budget of CAN$16 billion was established to operate and sustain the F-35 over 20 years. These budgets were based on estimates provided by National Defence, yet there is no documented analysis to show how they were developed … In March 2011, National Defence responded publicly to the Parliamentary Budget Officer’s report. This response did not include estimated operating, personnel, or ongoing training costs (Exhibit 2.6). Also, we observed that National Defence told parliamentarians that cost data provided by US authorities had been validated by US experts and partner countries, which was not accurate at the time. At the time of its response, National Defence knew the costs were likely to increase but did not so inform parliamentarians.

Lessons learned from the F-35 acquisition debacle

By Philippe Lagassé - Tuesday, April 3, 2012 at 3:28 PM - 0 Comments

Adrian Wyld/CP

Between 2006-2010, the Department of National Defence (DND) made a concerted effort to ensure that Canada’s CF-18s would be replaced by a sole-sourced procurement of sixty-five F-35A Joint Strike Fighters. In so doing, the defence department flouted several procurement procedures and practices. A timely replacement of the CF-18s and the acquisition of the F-35 are now in doubt, as a result.

As detailed in today’s report from the Auditor General, DND underestimated the likely cost of the F-35, embellished the possible industrial benefits associated with the acquisition, failed to correctly analyze the risks associated with buying an aircraft in the midst of development, and did not provide sufficient evidence to justify a sole-sourced acquisition when prompted by Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC). Through it all, DND was adamant that a competition was unnecessary to replace the CF-18s, since the F-35 was the best plane, for the best price.

The Conservative government accepted DND’s logic and allowed the defence department to press ahead. Indeed, although DND and the Chief of the Air Staff are identified as the main culprits in this saga, there is no question that Conservative ministers are also to blame.

The Auditor General’s report highlights that Conservative ministers announced the F-35 purchase in July 2010, two months after PWGSC warned that a sole-source procurement had not been properly explained, and a month before Public Works actually received the statement of requirements that purported to show why the F-35 was the only possible option.

Ministers were aware that the sole-source procurement had not been vetted, yet they endorsed it anyhow. And PWGCS’s ability to enforce proper procurement practices fell apart once the Conservatives publicly declared their intention to move forward with the acquisition that summer.

Once they had announced that the F-35 was Canada’s next fighter, moreover, Conservative ministers refused to question DND’s unsubstantiated estimates and figures until the aircraft’s widely reported cost overruns and technical difficulties could no longer be ignored.  Hence, although the Auditor General focuses on the errors and oversights of DND and PWGCS, it is evident that Conservative ministers failed in their responsibilities, too.

More to the point, no ministers should be permitted to avoid their constitutional responsibility for the affairs of the departments, no matter how much ignorance or inexperience they claim. Allowing ministers to shift their responsibility onto their departments or officials, however poorly they performed, would undermine the very bedrock of our system of responsible government.

But besides what it means for the F-35 and principles of accountability, what are we to take away from the Auditor General’s report? One lesson, certainly, is that procurement practices exist for a reason, and there is a price to pay when they are deliberately discarded or undermined.

Too many within Canada’s defence establishment are ready to cast aside bureaucratic processes when comes time to buy new equipment for the Canadian Forces. Protracted interdepartmental consultations, stubborn gatekeepers, and endless approval requirements, it is often said, prevent the CF from getting the equipment it needs in a timely manner.

And this has resonated with the Conservative government. Since 2006, it has negotiated notable sole-sourced military procurements, such as the acquisition of four C-17 strategic-lift aircraft.  Several other accelerated purchases were used to address critical capability shortfalls that were endangering CF lives in Afghanistan. Given the demands and dangers of the Kandahar mission, most of these hastened procurements were justified and could be exempt from lengthy, competitive tenders.

Unfortunately, this willingness to downplay the hazards of circumventing proper procurement practices was allowed to spread to less pressing acquisitions.  This was a key finding of the Auditor General’s report on the acquisition of the CF’s new Chinook medium-to-heavy lift helicopters, and it is now a notable criticism found in the report on the F-35.

If the F-35 was truly the best aircraft to replace the CF-18s, then it would have won a proper, transparent competition. In fact, a number of analysts, defence officials, and air force officers would still argue that it is undoubtedly the only plane for the CF. Yet the aircraft has now been tainted, as has DND’s argument in favour of it. And as the Auditor General notes, it will now be difficult to hold a fair competition. Consequently, the DND may not get the plane they are convinced that the CF needs. A fair, transparent competition would likely have avoided this outcome.

Philippe Lagassé is an assistant professor of public and international affairs at the University of Ottawa

The NDP response

By Aaron Wherry - Tuesday, April 3, 2012 at 12:38 PM - 0 Comments

The New Democrats want an apology.

“We see a clear trend — from the G8 fiasco to the F35s — of these Conservatives hiding information from Canadians,” said New Democrat MP Matthew Kellway (Beaches-East York). “Canadians expect a government that is upfront, but Conservatives deliberately misled Parliament. They should apologize to Canadians.”

The Liberal response

By Aaron Wherry - Tuesday, April 3, 2012 at 12:13 PM - 0 Comments

The Liberals blame the Prime Minister.

“The Harper Conservatives have done nothing but stonewall and withhold vital information from Canadians,” said Liberal Defence critic John McKay. “Now they appear ready to throw bureaucrats and our armed forces under yet another bus, but Canadians won’t be fooled. Responsibility for this fiasco lies squarely on the Prime Minister’s desk. Other NATO governments shared facts, told the truth and allowed for public debate. The Harper Conservatives tried to hide the truth, attacked their political opponents and have refused to come clean. They are still refusing to do so. Their conduct has been nothing less than disgraceful and the fault lies with one man, whose style of leadership has been exposed for all to see in this report.”

The Harper government responds

By Aaron Wherry - Tuesday, April 3, 2012 at 11:07 AM - 0 Comments

A release issued by the offices of Julian Fantino, Peter MacKay, Rona Ambrose and Christian Paradis.

The Honourable Julian Fantino, Associate Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Rona Ambrose, Minister of Public Works and Government Services and Minister for Status of Women, the Honourable Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence, and the Honourable Christian Paradis, Minister of Industry, today released the Government of Canada’s comprehensive response to Chapter 2 of the 2012 Spring Report of the Auditor General of Canada.

In Chapter 2, Replacing Canada’s Fighter Jets, the Auditor General recommends that the Government refine its estimates for the full life-cycle costs of the F-35 and make those estimates public. The Government accepts the Auditor General’s recommendation and conclusions.

The Government of Canada is taking the following seven steps to fulfill and exceed the Auditor General’s recommendation: Continue…

The Auditor General on the F-35

By Aaron Wherry - Tuesday, April 3, 2012 at 10:08 AM - 0 Comments

The Auditor General’s spring report is here. Chapter 2, on replacing Canada’s fighter jets, begins here.

National Defence did not exercise due diligence in managing the process to replace the CF-18 jets. National Defence did not appropriately consult Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) on the procurement implications of the 2006 MOU for the third phase of the JSF Program or develop an appropriate plan for managing the unique aspects of the acquisition. Problems relating to development of the F-35 were not fully communicated to decision makers, and risks presented to decision makers did not reflect the problems the JSF Program was experiencing at the time. Full life-cycle costs were understated in the estimates provided to support the government’s 2010 decision to buy the F-35. Some costs were not fully provided to parliamentarians. There was a lack of timely and complete documentation to support the procurement strategy decision.

The Canadian Press, Globe, iPolitics, CBC, Postmedia and Reuters review the findings.

Awaiting the auditor general’s word

By Aaron Wherry - Tuesday, April 3, 2012 at 8:30 AM - 0 Comments

Ahead of this morning’s release of the auditor general’s report, sources tell the Post, CBC and Globe that the Harper government will change its handling of the procurement process and sort of consider its options.

The government will vow to evaluate all options for the procurement of Canada’s next-generation fighter – raising doubts about its commitment to the F-35. But sources cautioned against interpreting this to mean that the Conservative government is actively considering purchasing a different jet. “The F-35 train is still on the track,” one government source said.

Rather, sources said, this would mean exploring whether to shift the F-35 purchase schedule so that it occurs more squarely in the lowest-cost production years – and considering how to make the existing fleet of CF-18 jets fly longer.

The AG’s report will be tabled in the House shortly after 10am.